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Kritiking as Argumentative Praxis 
Joseph P. Zompetti and Brian Lain 
Introduction 
Controversies in the realm of academic debate are often assessed with the 
standards used for other social science confrontations. The notion of paradigms, 
introduced by Thomas Kuhn (1970) to describe scientific revolutions, provides a 
starting point for analyzing the current conflict over kritiking.1 Despite this, pre-
vious discussions concerning the so-called “kritik” have focused mainly on 
whether it should be considered a legitimate argument form in contemporary 
policy debate (Berube, 1996; Katsulas, 1996/1997; Morris, 1996/1997). In this 
way, these discussions have become embroiled in a back-and-forth squabbling. 
Overcoming the tendency to steadfastly proclaim the legitimacy/illegitimacy of 
kritiks as an argument form is necessary if we are to extend argument theory in 
relation to the kritik.  
In an effort to explore and extend argument theory, we offer three main po-
sitions in this essay. First, we argue that there is an emerging paradigm,2 which 
we call the “questioning-assumptions paradigm” that is evolving out of a con-
flict with the current policy-making paradigm. After describing the current con-
troversy between these paradigms in debate, the major arguments lodged against 
kritiking (as a way of viewing argument rather than as an argument form) will 
be explained as a way of analyzing the paradigmatic differences, especially with 
the concept of fiat. Second, we suggest that there is room for dialogue among 
these two paradigms that lies within the concept of fiat. Policy-making is con-
cerned with what the judge does when adjudicating a “policy.” The questioning-
assumptions paradigm is concerned with how a judge endorses a “process,” 
which we call “fiat kritiking.” We argue that a bridge of compromise can be 
forged between these two concepts of fiat. Finally, we offer this conception of 
kritiking as a means of argumentative praxis, whereby argument theory is cou-
pled with a unique experience of debate “action.” In this way, we suggest that 
kritiking is an exciting area for both argument theory and contemporary debate 
practice that, at the very least, deserves an investigation which transcends the 
already stale “legitimate/illegitimate” dispute that has characterized previous 
kritik discussions. 
Paradigmatic Conflict 
Thomas Kuhn (1970), in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
introduces the idea of systems of thought operating in paradigms. Along these 
lines, we may view a paradigm as a worldview or conceptual model “shared by 
members of a scholarly community that defines how inquiry within the commu-
nity should be conducted” (Smith, 1988, p. 299). More specifically, Kuhn expli-
cates the idea of a paradigm in two ways: 
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On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. 
On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the 
concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can 
replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puz-
zles of normal science. (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175) 
Paradigms, therefore, are characterized by their different ways of seeing and 
“knowing” the world. This feature removes the “truth” variable of one paradigm 
from another; in other words, paradigms simply see the world differently. Kuhn 
explains that it is inaccurate to describe different paradigms as unscientific just 
because several of their tenets are called into question by the preceding para-
digm, since “What differentiated these various schools was not one or another 
failure of method — they were all ‘scientific’ — but what we shall come to call 
their incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practicing science in it” 
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 4). 
Paradigms are often applied to systems of debate theory (Pfau, Thomas & 
Ulrich, 1987). Paradigms are used to examine how the entire worldview of de-
bate participants and judges is affected in different ways. Usually, two or more 
paradigms are compared to illustrate the conflicts between the differing world-
views. In fact, as one paradigm emerges, it is often thought that the existing, 
predominant paradigm becomes replaced. Within the debate context, Pfau and 
his colleagues (1987) have expressed that “[d]ebate is generated by shifts in 
paradigms. During this period of transition between the era dominated by the 
‘normal’ paradigm, and the new era when the alternative paradigm replaces it, 
many controversies and debates are conducted over the whole nature of the field 
and the specific methods used to study and advance the field” (pp. 6-7). 
The policy-making paradigm has been described as the prevailing paradigm 
in contemporary debate history. Generally, this paradigm prescribes the roles of 
debaters and judges by using a making-of-policy model, such as the U.S. Con-
gress. Ziegelmueller, Harris and Bloomingdale (1995) explain: 
A . . . model of debate is derived from an analogy to the policy making 
process typified by congressional decision making. The subject matter of 
the debate is typically concerned with the development of public policy. 
Consequently, theorists have suggested modeling the argument practices 
found in congressional debates. (pp. 18-19) 
Without going into all of the formal tenets of the policy-making paradigm, 
we should have a general feeling of what this view of debating is about. As a 
deductive model of debate, it seeks to “force nature [debate] into the conceptual 
boxes supplied by professional education” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 5). 
Given the predominance of the policy-making paradigm, alternative or 
competing paradigms have been relatively few in number in the past few years. 
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One such recent challenge has been the hypothesis-testing paradigm which 
views the debate round as a laboratory that “tests” different (and not necessarily 
mutually-exclusive) methods of change, as if they were “hypothesis” statements 
(Hollihan, 1983; Patterson & Zarefsky, 1983; Zarefsky & Henderson, 1983). 
Yet, the prevailing support for the policy-making paradigm has resulted in a 
general dismissal of the hypothesis-testing paradigm as a viable or accepted 
worldview. In the wake of this type of paradigmatic flux, we believe this is the 
first time that the argument style of “kritiking” has been presented as a separate 
paradigm. Indeed, we feel that this paradigmatic flux may mean that policy-
making as a paradigm is particularly vulnerable to challenge, or that “kritiking” 
as a paradigm may be premature. Nevertheless, the responses from the margins 
of the debate community concerning the viability of the kritik as an appropriate 
argument form has gained increasing acceptance. Thus, for our purposes here, 
we suggest that engaging in kritiking may represent a developing worldview that 
might be called the “questioning-assumptions” paradigm. 
Difficulty exists in describing this amorphous paradigm. Even as this de-
scription will no doubt reveal, new suppositions and opinions are made about 
this paradigm at an increasing rate. It would be impossible to produce a set of 
rules or characterize the identities of all who support the questioning-
assumptions paradigm. Not only does the style of this paradigm subvert an ex-
plicit definition, as we shall see later, but it is also impossible to describe the 
differing views of each individual in the debate community who supports the 
kritik as an argumentative form. Nonetheless, this phenomenon is similar to 
what Kuhn describes as a “challenging” paradigm. While discussing the scien-
tists’ response to the revolutionary notions of Newton, Lavosier, Maxwell, or 
Einstein, Kuhn states: 
They can, that is, agree on their identification of a paradigm without agree-
ing on, or even attempting to produce, a full interpretation or rationaliza-
tion of it. Lack of a standard interpretation of an agreed reduction to rules 
will not prevent a paradigm from guiding research. . . .Indeed, the existence 
of a paradigm need not even imply that any full set of rules exist. (1970, p. 
44) 
Although Kuhn does not do much to describe the “maturing” process of a chal-
lenging paradigm, he clearly expresses that even the formation of a paradigm 
may be classified as a worldview: 
To that end it may help to point out that the transition need not (I now think 
should not) be associated with the first acquisition of a paradigm. The 
members of all scientific communities, including the schools of the “pre-
paradigm” period, share the sorts of elements which I have collectively la-
belled [sic] a “paradigm.” (1970, p. 179) 
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Thus, our conception of questioning assumptions might also be labeled a 
“paradigm.” While we agree with Kuhn in describing the nature of a paradigm, 
we part with his belief that paradigms are mutually exclusive, or that when one 
paradigm emerges it necessarily displaces the existing paradigm. We believe 
that paradigms can co-exist and even, at times, share common threads within 
their respective worldviews. With the so-called judging “paradigms” or “phi-
losophies” that exist in academic debate, we know that some judges have 
changed their paradigms, even in the middle of a debate round, because their 
personal beliefs intervened in the adjudicating process. Debate participants 
themselves also undergo fundamental “worldview” changes that may not be 
inconsistent with their prior ways of thinking. Our contention is that these para-
digms always already intersect. It is our failure to negotiate this intersection that 
has created the paradigmatic tension. 
With this in mind, we maintain that the questioning-assumptions paradigm 
is comprised of three crucial tenets. These tenets indicate how the questioning-
assumptions paradigm is both significant and important for resolving paradig-
matic conflict. First, advocates of the questioning-assumptions paradigm hold 
that debate arguments contain “taken-for-granteds” (Hazen, 1989; Hopper, 
1981; Schutz, 1967). The concept of taken-for-granteds, according to Hopper 
(1981), refers to “[u]ncoded, ‘between-the-lines’ information” (p. 196) that “are 
missing premises of messages” and are “frequently understood [sic] as if spo-
ken” (p. 207). The questioning-assumptions paradigm holds that when advocates 
make claims, a part of these claims is unstated. Whenever an argument is made, 
“implicit assumptions” or hidden parts of the argument persist. For example, to 
say that Egypt should receive more U.S. military training is to say implicitly that 
Egypt is a legitimate nation-state. Different perceptions inside the paradigm may 
explain these assumptions as other argument forms, such as an Aristotelian en-
thymeme, a Toulmin unstated warrant, types of linguistic analogs, etc. Neverthe-
less, there is agreement that a part of contemporary debate argument contains 
unstated assumptions. 
The second tenet of the questioning-assumptions paradigm is that these hid-
den assumptions are open for debate. Some debaters may say that advocates are 
responsible for the unstated portions of their claims; others may simply say that 
is the hidden assumptions that are the precursors to the present argument. If they 
are called into question, the present argument is also called into question. The 
allowance of the questioning of these assumptions is what primarily distin-
guishes this paradigm from other debate paradigms. 
Finally, the questioning-assumptions paradigm upholds a particular way of 
advocacy. Advocacy requires taking a position on a side of controversy. Advo-
cacy, then, is acting out what the advocate believes. We suggest that thinking of 
advocacy in this way is a method of praxis. The choices made in debate rounds 
which, in-turn, affect the choices we or on-lookers make in our lives and within 
the questioning-assumptions paradigm is a way not only to engage in critical 
thinking, but also to engage in an action of advocacy. This action of advocacy is 
the coupling of debate theory/beliefs with purposeful action in and outside the 
debate round. In short, advocacy is a way of engaging in praxis. Because critical 
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thinking and advocacy are “traditionally” elements of the policy-making para-
digm, we suggest that praxis is yet another way that paradigmatic conflict can be 
overcome. 
The descriptions provided here are primarily definitions of what the terms 
policy-making and questioning-assumptions mean in this context. Surely the 
most complete descriptions of these paradigms will come as one evolves in op-
position to the other, or when we realize that the worldviews can effectively co-
exist. Since the questioning-assumptions paradigm is still emerging, there can be 
no definitive statement of its views for all debate situations. However, the para-
digm is sculpted by the areas in conflict (with policy-making) over the issues of 
fiat and, consequently, debatability. Despite this conflict, we believe that we 
need to rethink the relationship between these paradigms. If we begin to see 
their relationship through the concept of fiat, we may find that the paradigms 
can co-exist. 
Paradigmatic Resolution Through Fiat 
Describing debate paradigms in this way demonstrates major controversies 
in kritiking among the advocates and judges. Both the policy-making and the 
questioning-assumptions paradigms have different conceptions of advocacy. 
Primarily, the question concerning advocacy is, what is fiat? This difference in 
opinion is multiplied when we see that proponents of each paradigm argue about 
the fundamental purpose of the debate round. We will try to use the language of 
each paradigm to describe the problems found in two major contentions: 1) no 
alternative/no uniqueness vs. kritiking as an alternative, and 2) doing nothing vs. 
the thought/action dichotomy. 
The idea that a “policy” must be advocated is a crucial element within the 
policy-making paradigm. At the end of the debate either a proposed policy (the 
affirmative plan or a negative counterplan) or the policy of the status quo should 
be embraced. The benefits and drawbacks to each proposal is weighed carefully 
before the final determination is made. In short, the policy-making paradigm 
upholds that the judge needs a “policy” to vote for. In this way, the claim that 
kritiks offer “no alternative” has been a major complaint of the policy-making 
paradigm. The argument goes something like this: 
The negative (or affirmative) questions the affirmative (or negative), but 
they don’t provide us with anything to question. They simply poke out 
problems with the our proposal, but they don’t defend anything themselves. 
If we are to reject the system (or whatever), we need something to adopt. 
The negative (or affirmative) can’t just kritik; they must also advocate 
something. 
Recently, uniqueness has been tacked onto this argument: 
The status quo is also guilty of the problems the negative describes. Even if 
the plan weren’t done, there would still be sexism, racism, classism, etc. 
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The problems inherent in the world system aren’t the fault of the affirma-
tive. Therefore, the problem is non-unique to the affirmative plan. 
The combination of these two answers has been the most common criticism 
lodged against kritiking. In a recent defense of the new American Debate Asso-
ciation rule that all kritiks be “unique,” Stefan Bauschard “takes a walk out on 
the plank” to suggest that “one thing that all critiques [sic] have in common is 
that they are all disadvantages which are not unique to the affirmative plan” 
(1995, p. 3).3 Thus, the “no alternative” argument mutates into an argument that 
is familiar in the policy-making style of argument. 
In their often cited work criticizing what they call “Critiques,” Shors and 
Mancuso contribute to the uniqueness attack: 
The strategic benefit of running a Critique lies in its set of rules, namely its 
rejection of conventional argument burdens. For example, the burden of 
“uniqueness,” which requires both the affirmative and negative to demon-
strate that advantages and disadvantages are uniquely caused by the plan, is 
wholly irrelevant to the Critique as its rules currently operate. Herein lies 
one of the biggest defects of the Critique, because its insistence on adhering 
to the rigid rule of rejection is artificial. (1993, p. A-16)4 
According to this perspective, since there is no alternative and the kritik is a 
non-unique disadvantage, there is no reason to reject the affirmative. “Doing 
nothing” is also a common criticism placed against kritik advocates. This late-
breaking monster is usually seen in rebuttals. Although it comes into play in 
most kritiking debates, it is rarely considered as a distinct line-by-line attack. 
Yet, this argument speaks volumes about how the policy-making paradigm de-
scribes its view of fiat. The answer can be characterized this way: 
Even if the negative is right, they aren’t going to accomplish anything. 
The plan advantages are real. If you do not vote affirmative, millions 
will die. While you will be sitting around “rethinking,” millions will 
die. 
This characterization zooms-in on the thought that kritiking is separate from 
action. It also places a direct comparison between the plan advantages and the 
advantage/benefit of kritiking. 
There have been many replies fired against the “no alternative/uniqueness” 
queries that are offered by kritiking opponents. At the heart of the issue is what 
one considers fiatable action/thinking. The questioning-assumptions paradigm 
suggests that kritiking may (is allowed to) be the “alternative.” 
Rather than just accept policy options as considerations for voting, the 
judge can consider endorsing a process of kritiking. The over-adherence to the 
“cult of uniqueness” leaves advocates who seek radical overhauls of any given 
system without a rhetorical leg to stand on. The reply in theory has been to ac-
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cept the process as fiatable. Take the example of Edward Said’s (1978) oriental-
ism argument during the recent NDT Middle East topic. Negatives advocated a 
system of rethinking particular to a questioning of history, culture, military, so-
cial systems, etc., that seeks to expose how knowledge (as Truth) has been used 
coercively against oppressed Middle Eastern peoples in U.S. policy. What 
would a judge be voting for in this instance? He or she would be voting for 
kritiking, rethinking, questioning. The judge is voting to place this interrogative, 
dynamic process into motion. 
We might imagine attempting to break down all the components of a debate 
into columns of what one would be voting for and how they would be voting for 
it. An analogy can be drawn with traveling. Vehicles are used to get to places; 
destinations are what is sought after. Both are critical to traveling. 
 Destination Vehicle 
 Detroit Our Chevette 
 Los Angeles  Delta Airlines 
The Lake The Third Path in the Forest 
This analogy can be broadened with debate in mind. The What column be-
low represents desirable ends that are sought after in the debate context. The 
How column describes the mechanism used to achieve those ends. For example: 
What How5 
 Advantage  Plan 
 Disadvantage  Status Quo 
 Disadvantage  Counterplan 
 Net Benefit  Permutation 
 Advantage  Plan 
Stop nuclear war  Harvard’s plan 
 Disadvantage  Plan mechanism 
Clinton popularity Keep status quo 
 Disadvantage  Counterplan 
Federalism States do the plan 
This categorization separates value specifications and things that are fiat-
able. Up to this point, there is no controversy with the policy-making paradigm. 
However, when kritiks (noun) are included in the what/destination column, then 
the problems with the “cult of uniqueness” start to emerge. What does the col-
umn look like from this perspective? 
 What How 
 Kritik Status quo? 
 Kritik Cool negative team? 
 Kritik Our Chevette 
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We can see that as an argument type (a noun), the kritik creates a stale and 
even unproductive debate, especially with respect to our understanding of pol-
icy-making. However, it is here that the advocacy of kritiking (verb) inserts a 
new option into the mix: 
 Value Kritiking 
 Avoid orientalism  Rethinking 
Prevent gendered problems Use gender lenses 
Destroy government hierarchy Question statism 
It is the notion that fiat applies to the process of kritiking that primarily de-
fines what we have been calling the questioning-assumptions paradigm. The 
affirmative suggests a plan to travel to the advantages, the negative suggests 
rethinking as a way to achieve the value (or other element) that they suggest is 
paramount. Kritiking in this way functions as a sort of counterplan.6 In some 
senses, kritiking may claim the affirmative advantage, just as a counterplan may 
claim to “solve” the advantage. We might also view this as an ends/means dis-
tinction. We may agree with the ends of the plan (i.e., the advantage), but not the 
mechanism (i.e., the plan).7 
The questioning-assumptions paradigm also has a major reply to the “doing 
nothing” criticism. The questioning-assumptions paradigm views thinking as 
fiatable. As such, the other paradigm is accused to adhering to a thought vs. ac-
tion dichotomy. In other words, policy-making may ask, “What are you doing?” 
We may respond, “Just thinking.” Then the retort, “Well, then, you are doing 
nothing!” 
There is a long line of philosophy that questions the ability to distinguish 
thought from action (e.g., Hegel, 1931; Heidegger, 1962; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; 
Sartre, 1976). Not only does thought influence action and action influence 
thought, but it is also difficult to distinguish, especially in debate, where the 
thinking ends and where the action begins. 
Fiat is the best example of where thinking and acting blur in debate. Using 
the tenets of fiat based on the policy-making tradition, we may ask ourselves the 
following: Does the plan actually happen? Does the Congress actually pass the 
plan? Are we just doing nothing? This is not intended as an illegitimacy argu-
ment about fiat. The ability to suspend disbelief over whether or not the plan 
would occur is essential if we are to have productive, educational and fun de-
bates. However, kritiking isn’t “doing nothing” in debate either. The process of 
debating might be likened to the process of (re)thinking. There is some action 
involved — speaking, researching, lifting boxes, etc. — but it is primarily the 
(critical) thinking that we encourage and reward in debate. When asked what is 
endorsed by kritiking, the negative should reply, “We are actively exploring, 
questioning, rethinking, kritiking the problem. We are not endorsing the status 
quo. We seek the rejection of both the affirmative plan and the status quo. Vote 
to adopt rethinking as a process of change!” 
Although the suggestion of kritiking as an alternative was intended as a 
compromise from the questioning-assumptions paradigm, it has yet to be ac-
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cepted fully among policy makers. Three different interpretations of how sign-
ing the ballot as action present themselves for consideration.8 Under each of 
them, the option of fiating kritiking9 exists. Fiating kritiking “uses” fiat as a 
mechanism to adopt a process of (re)thinking. Perhaps fiating kritiking can best 
be explained by way of example. 
The first option for fiat is that the judge plays the role of “debate person,” or 
simply a person who operates within the debate activity. The judge is seen as a 
coach or bus driver or parent who sees the activity for its educational value. To 
fiat kritiking is easy to see in this case. Voting affirmative could occur because 
the plan is a “good idea” or because the affirmative did the “better job of debat-
ing.” Likewise, voting negative can also be viewed as an endorsement for 
kritiking — a rejection of the plan as a “bad idea,” or the negative did the better 
job of debating. The endorsement in this case may be intellectual or punishment-
oriented, as in cases of rejecting sexist or racist language. Nevertheless, the 
judge would be voting for kritiking. 
A second example views the judge as an actual policy maker. The judge has 
the ability to force Congress to do the plan. Whether this ability is metaphorical 
or something actually believed is irrelevant. All arguments are assessed in this 
manner. The judge views the advantage to the plan as greater than the disadvan-
tages, or vice versa. There is a large difference between weighing the 
(dis)advantages of the plan as a reason for voting and “they did a better job of 
debating.” 
A third model of fiat places the judge not as an overseer of policy, but 
rather as a participant. For some reason the judge is the policy maker who has 
the deciding vote on the question of the plan/counterplan/status quo. The scene 
of the debate is the floor of Congress and the judge has to give a speech for or 
against the plan, counterplan, or status quo. That speech will determine the out-
come. We might envision some of the constraints suggested as impositions of 
kritiking under this vision of judging: “this is the wrong forum; Congress 
wouldn’t discuss these issues of philosophy,” or “we are constrained to do pol-
icy here!” 
Under the latter two views, the judge has several options to fiat (it clearly is 
a verb in this sense). The plan may be done, a counterplan, or staying the course 
may be suggested. All of these fiated actions are executed by a governing body. 
Why not then have the judge endorse the kritiking option on the governing 
body? We could have the judge force Congress to rethink. The judge could fiat 
that the U.S. Government question threat construction as a reason for conducting 
foreign policy. The deciding speech given on the question of health care reform 
could be a well-constructed discussion of the problems of Western medicine, 
concluded by endorsing not the present system nor the policy on the floor, but 
rather a third option of beginning a quest of rethinking to uncover the problems 
of medicine and how Western medicine is flawed. Fiat the kritiking by the gov-
ernment on the problem outlined by the debate team. Fiat the kritiking! 
A response to this view may be that the option is already present in the 
strategy of counterplanning. A two-fold rejoinder is offered here. First, the criti-
cism that a counterplan is needed begs the question that there is some distinction 
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between fiating kritiking and counterplanning. Another way of stating this alter-
native may be “counter-thinking.”10 The though/action dichotomy is disputed in 
this form of fiat. Is there a difference between saying, “plank one, we suggest 
the Congress rethink,” and saying, “the Congress should rethink?” If there is, we 
must reside in a “cult of planks” since having a plank (for the sake of having a 
plank) is the only real difference. 
Second, several modes of kritiking call policy-making into question. The 
idea that a plan should be done, that we can ever find a solution, that a “course 
of action” ought to be taken might be the thesis of the kritiking process. For ex-
ample, several strands of feminism hold the view that the problem/solution for-
mat is a patriarchal tool (e.g., Anzaldua, 1987; Benhabib, 1987; Butler, 1990, 
1992, 1995; Ganguly, 1992) Announcing that we have a solution not only fore-
closes future discussion, but it also chills the discussion of the problems for 
which there are no available solutions. 
Fiating kritiking is not suggested as solution, but rather as a wholesale way 
of questioning/thinking. It is an exploration of the problem that may produce not 
a solution, but a better understanding of the problem which, for policy-making, 
should be appealing. In other words, a particular policy may be racist, classist, 
sexist, etc., but forcing the institution to rethink these problems is not an en-
dorsement for the institution or for a policy. It is, rather, an endorsement for 
questioning. 
 
Kritiking qua Praxis 
Our position is that the debate round is more than just a “game.” It is, 
rather, a forum for advocacy. Even if the debate team does not (in “reality”) be-
lieve their position, they nevertheless must take a position in the debate context. 
The debate round becomes, if nothing else, a training ground for how to advo-
cate a position. Integral to this concept is the ability to think critically, which is 
obtained by, among other things, intense research experience, anticipation of 
opposing arguments, skills in cross-examination, mastery of reasoning by analy-
sis and synthesis, and the ability to take a position of advocacy on opposite sides 
of a proposition. In other words, critical thinking is the ability to know how and 
when to ask questions. We view this combination of advocacy with the ability to 
think critically as a coupling of theory with action (advocacy). Simply put, 
kritiking occurs as a form of praxis, or at least helps to frame praxis, in an argu-
mentative format. 
The ability to think critically should not be limited to a situation where X is 
chosen for discussion, researched, and then debated. Instead, critical thinking in 
debate can be (and is) expanded to ask questions about X: what is it, how does it 
function, is it valuable, does it contribute to the good of society? Arguments in 
the form of kritik ask such questions, among others. To this end, the critical 
thinking skills in debate are polished to include factors otherwise ignored. In 
fact, if we are going to emphasize the critical thinking skills that debate fosters 
as a selling point to recruits, parents and administrators, then we should inquire 
about how we can improve such skills. Ignoring critical factors and questions 
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about the nature of the topic, such as X, does not bid well for an activity that 
stresses its ability to think critically. 
Additionally, while most contemporary debates are absent of spectators, ex-
cept typically for final rounds which are attended by fellow debaters, the debate 
is still a public event. Nothing precludes or forbids observations of NDT de-
bates. Also, many debates are videotaped or transcribed for classes, public offi-
cials and parents throughout the country. Thus, academic debate is not decoup-
led from the non-debate world. As such, academic debate is a forum for argu-
ments meant to advance the skills and education of its participants but also to 
influence others who do not debate. Oral advocacy, then, becomes a serious en-
terprise in which “real” thoughts, stereotypes, beliefs, and policies are affected. 
Furthermore, the debate participants themselves, after years of debating, become 
conditioned to their style of debating and ways of thinking. This educational 
process and experience undoubtedly affects the way debaters think and act once 
they graduate and enter society. Thus, as we have been arguing, kritiking can 
help expand and intensify the quality of oral advocacy in contemporary aca-
demic debate. It promotes a range of possibilities that can serve effective oral 
advocacy. Additionally, because debate is a forum with multiple audiences and 
with the potential to influence different social groups, kritiking can have “real” 
consequences other than those typically encountered in a debate round. 
In essence, then, by advocating that their positions are better, the partici-
pants make value judgments. They take a position about an issue and make ar-
guments about that issue’s worthiness, especially as it is compared to competing 
issues. The debate round becomes a forum whereby the merits of issues are ar-
ticulated. 
The debate round also allows feedback from the audience and judge(s). Af-
ter the debaters conclude their positions of advocacy, the effect of the round can 
be seen in post-round critiques. Judges can explain why they were or were not 
persuaded from the policy arguments presented in the debate. Of course, judges 
do not actually implement an affirmative plan. However, judges may be (can be) 
persuaded — based upon the debating — to take personal action, such as 
changed ways of thinking, writing letters to NGOs or government leaders, and 
the adoption of certain positions when they talk to friends or teach classes. Addi-
tionally, judge comments after the round may influence the debaters in a similar 
fashion. Of course, arguments presented in the debate have unlimited possibility 
in influencing other audience members as well. 
The debate round, therefore, can serve to persuade people about policy im-
plications that transcend the hypothetical issues of debate, such as fiat and topi-
cality. Substantive issues that affect the participants in an everyday fashion can 
be (are) discussed. Debaters have often used these types of arguments to per-
suade judges, such as “Judge, you have children, and I doubt that you relish the 
thought of your kids growing up in a nuclear winter.” Such arguments bring the 
often abstract nature of policy positions down-to-earth and function as a particu-
lar type of persuasive technique. Kritiking supplements this process by encour-
aging participants to adhere to critical thinking once the debate round is over. In 
other words, a kritiking can encourage the judge not only to vote a certain way 
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because a hypothetical policy may result in nuclear winter, but also, for exam-
ple, to take personal action against nuclear power or nuclear weapons. 
Debate’s nature of persuasion and advocacy creates an atmosphere where 
debaters talk and judges listen. If compelled, judges may reciprocate with their 
own thoughts and opinions after the last speech. In any case, the debate round 
provides a forum, not only for intellectual competition, but also social activism. 
It offers an opportunity for “real” people with “real” problems to persuade oth-
ers about “real-world” solutions. 
In this way, the debate round can become a site for political struggle. Politi-
cal concerns that are germane to the policy being debated can be waged into the 
debate round. Actual persuasion and personal transformation can occur if par-
ticipants remain open to how viewing debate arguments (i.e., kritiking) relates to 
their non-debate lives. Kritiking, therefore, can be a form of social activism. 
Kritiking opens a space for social activism in another way. Kritiking re-
quires additional ways of thinking and arguing, an openness for alternative per-
spectives, and new methods of research. Just as “traditional” debate skills help 
debaters in other areas of life both during and after their debate careers, skills in 
kritiking also help participants in other areas. For example, the expanded ways 
of thinking that kritiking instills helps people become better critical thinkers and 
more sensitive to political concerns than do other debate skills. Kritiking helps 
train participants to recognize certain ways of thinking that typically entrench 
power relationships. As such, people who engage in kritiking become more 
likely to engage in social activism. At the very least, the critical skills that are 
intrinsic to kritiking encourage people to be active socially and politically be-
cause such concerns are given primacy by the questioning-assumptions para-
digm. 
Conclusion 
Constructed scenarios and far-fetched nuclear war scenarios sometimes ap-
pear to have no grounding in reality, but are instead productions of the most 
clever and most researched debate squads. While we maintain that these 
“traditional” ways of arguing are valuable and should be encouraged, an-
other way of seeing argument — kritiking — helps bring debate back to 
“reality.” The participants in the round can take positions, criticize, and at-
tempt to persuade their audience for reasons other than intellectual stimula-
tion or skills development. Instead, participants who feel strongly about the 
values underlying policy questions can take a critical position that encour-
ages personal reflection and action outside of the debate round. Through 
kritiking, participants are more likely to increase their involvement in soci-
ety than they are with “traditional” debating. The reason is simple. Kritiking 
fosters a spirit of responsibility and a call to action. Each person is impor-
tant and should embrace their civic responsibility. When calling into ques-
tion the values underlying types of policies, this spirit of activism can 
emerge. Thus, kritiking — as a way of viewing argument — can function as 
a median for praxis. Furthermore, kritiking is representative of what we 
have been calling the questioning-assumptions paradigm. Since kritiking al-
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lows room for fiat and for a proposal to be advocated, we believe a recon-
ciliation between the policy-making and questioning-assumptions para-
digms is possible. It is our hope that future debate forums and debate rounds 
will continue in this benevolent pursuit. 
Notes 
1 We are using the verb “kritiking,” not the noun “kritik,” for two main reasons. 
First, the idea of THE kritik suggests there is just one possible kritik. How-
ever, we feel a “kritik” represents an argument style, not a monolithic argu-
ment form. Second, the verb usage implies a process, not a static image. 
Rather than suggesting an argument that has a known description, such as a 
disadvantage, kritiking is dynamic and evolutionary. 
2 To reflect our perspective of kritiking as a process — or a way of thinking, 
questioning or approaching a problem — we have chosen to use the word 
“paradigm” to describe it. We feel other descriptive words, such as field or 
philosophy, do not adequately illustrate the current tension that is occurring in 
the debate community concerning kritiking. 
3 Bauschard’s negative criticism toward the argument style of kritiks pervades 
his article. As he states on the question of what the focus of the debate should 
be: “[o]pening up this theoretical can of worms is a waste of time that could 
be spent discussing unsettled questions” (1995, p. 4). We feel this is proof of 
the current paradigmatic conflict over taken-for-granteds in debate. 
4 One might wonder what argument strategy is open to the negative. Shors and 
Mancuso state, “The Critique [sic] can and should be used as an instrument to 
challenge questionable thinking, be it ethnocentric, or whatever. It can be use-
ful in casting perspective on issues, but it should not be considered independ-
ent of comparison; it cannot be and remain meaningful. The Critique can be 
used as a disadvantage, solvency turn, a PMN, etc. — essentially anything but 
a kritik” (1993, p. A-17). This seems to harken back to Kuhn’s description of 
how old paradigms attempt to modify and take new anomalies into account — 
a sort of argumentative cooptation. The nuance of adopting kritiking is re-
jected, yet the system is said to always already represent such arguments. This 
is not to say that types of arguments such as disadvantages, solvency turns, 
PMNs, etc., are illegitimate. Rather, we feel these argument types can also co-
exist with kritiking, or at the very least must also meet the burden of defend-
ing the assumptions that lie underneath them. 
5 This particular analogy has its origins with Bill Shanahan.  
6 We take these words from Chris Lundberg of the University of Redlands, from 
the Semifinal round at Baylor University, 1996, where he was endorsing an 
argument from Spanos/Heidegger. 
7 Lundberg again. 
8 It is quite possible that there are more than three options. However, we feel 
these accurately represent the different paradigms under scrutiny. 
9 We find it ironic that such an argument is now discussed since the genesis of 
kritiking sprung from what was first called a “kritik of fiat.” Now, with the 
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usage of the verb and the movement inside of affirmative constructions of fiat, 
we have a “fiat of kritiks.” 
10 Please note the usage of a verb in this statement. Counter-thinking may be 
described above, but the option of a counter-thought (noun) has not been dis-
cussed in this article, and it is a totally different beast altogether. The counter-
thought may be another negative argument/argument strategy available to de-
baters under the questioning-assumptions paradigm. As far as we know, the 
only execution of a “counter-thought” has been by Chris LaVigne and Brian 
Wassom (Wayne State University) against Dave Arnett and Jason Renzel-
man’s (University of Louisville) kritik-like affirmative case during the Octa-
finals at Northwestern University, 1995. 
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